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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps. By Terrence Des Pres. 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1976, viii + 218 pp., bibliography, 
$10.00 (cloth). 
Recently several authors have attempted to tell us about human behavior 
in extremity and, by extension, about human nature. The Ik, in Turnbull's 
Mountain People, serve as a mirror in which we may see our future selves; writers, 
while telling us about human nature, warn us of  its darker side. The abhorrent 
aspects of  our bestial natures will be manifest in extremity, the argument runs, 
and we will soon face extreme conditions. Sending children to nursery schools in 
our own society is an incipient parallel, says Turnbull, to the exclusion of Ik 
children from their natal rights; the extreme selfishness of the Ik foreshadows the 
behavior of nations faced with worldwide famine. 
Because they are buttressed by observations of  people in extremity, it is 
difficult to counter these arguments. Yet there are counters, produced in "civil- 
ized" conditions by "civilized" human beings. One such is the Holocaust, the 
slaughter of  millions of Jews; another is the Soviet labor camps. 
Terrence Des Pres recounts and recasts the behavior of  the survivors of 
these events; in the recounting, there are new insights and, in the recasting, there 
are familiar hypotheses about human behavior. In his recounting, Des Pres draws 
from the descriptions given by the survivors and develops a number of  themes: 
his major thesis is that human beings survive as human beings, not as beasts, not 
as subhumans, not as infantile ids. The process of  survival strips people of  many 
of their attributes, to be sure, and such luxuries as compassion and hope may 
be lost. But the loss :is temporary; in place of superfluous sentiments comes a 
new realism. The theme of the book is human survival under inhuman conditions: 
"My subject is survival, the capacity of men and women to live beneath the 
pressure of  protracted crisis, to sustain terrible damage in mind and body and yet 
to be there, sane, alive, still human" (p.v). 
Des Pres's theme, can be dealt with on several levels. First, as a critique of 
theorists who see the victims' behavior as "infantile regression." Des Pres dis- 
agrees with analyses that explain concentration camp posture as one of total 
submission. He not only disagrees with the theories; he documents his disagree- 
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ment with accounts of  the experiences of  those who were helped to survive, of  
those who lived for years next to the gas chambers, o f  those who devised and 
enforced such things as the "Bread Law." From Auschwitz, after a bread thief 
is caught: 
"So what happened? Did the others beat him up?" 
"They killed him, of course. What's the use of beating up a bastard like that," 
That was the law in Block 18. If a man stole your food, you killed him. If you 
were not strong enough to carry out the sentence yourself, there were other execu- 
tioners; it was rough justice, but it was fair because to deprive a man of food was 
to murder. (Vrba, 115, quoted on p. 141) 
Justice, albeit rough-bu t  not mayhem, or chaos, or killing for its own 
sake. The Bread Law, according to Des Pres, "was the foundation and focal 
point of  moral order in the concentration camps" (p. 140). 
But the order that emerged is contrary to that posited by the psychoana- 
lysts; it is not an order imposed from without in imitation of  the captors- i t  is 
an internal arrangement in defiance of  the guards. Initially, fear and chaos pre- 
varied. Then, slowly, "in sorrow and a realism never before faced up to" (p. 146), 
order emerged, gifts were given, help was offered. 
On another level, the book is an answer to the question puzzled over by 
the psychohistorians and the psychoanalysts: why did the prisoners not revolt? 
Des Pres's answer is that they did revolt and they did resist, in all the ways pos- 
sible for them, once the preliminary shock of  being treated like animals had 
worn off: 
To pass from civilization to extemity means to be shorn of the elaborate system 
of relationships-to job, class, tradition and family, to groups and institutions 
of every kind-which for us provides ninety percent of what we think we are. 
(p. 182) 
It is easy to theorize about infantile regression and reversions to fascina- 
tion with excrement -bu t  harder to acknowledge or to imagine an excrement- 
filled environment. Yet this is what the survivors coped with-starvation, ex- 
crement, degradat ion-and it is from this coping that we learn about adaptation 
to unimaginable circumstances. One of  the most important points the book 
makes is that some of  the victims adapted to these conditions by creating a new 
social organization, appropriate to an excrement-Idled environment, appropriate 
to starvation. The problem with the easy theories is that they do not reflect the 
realities of  either social organization or environment. 
In part, the theories reflect our fantasies, and it appears that we of  the 
civilized world like to imagine that Hitler's Germany was a monolithic, perfect- 
ly coordinated war machine. The survivors, too shrewd and too poor to maintain 
such illusions, located the weak spots and set to work creating a viable social 
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structure in the chinks. They hid prisoners in the typhoid wards of hospitals; 
they smuggled bits of pitiful treasure to celebrate birthdays; they preserved in 
themselves their humanity, reordering it to fit the circumstances. 
Des Pres answers another question that plagues theorists: why degrade 
people who were already doomed? The answer: "To condition those who actually 
had to carry out the policies" (p. 61). The victims and their captors were human, 
and cultural conditioning was taking place on both sides. The captives had to be 
taught to die; the captors had to be taught to kill. 
In the recounting, Des Pres tells of a struggle for survival, of  revolt and of 
reordering that most of us have not heard. In the recasting, he makes some more 
familiar interpretive points. He believes that human beings possess "a set of 
activities evolved through time in successful response to cr is is . . . "  (p. 192). 
These activities are innate, genetically transmitted patterns that serve the "general 
cause of survival" (p. 193). But which aspects of the survivors' experiences are 
to be regarded the product of genetic transmission? Des Pres does not make this 
clear. "Bread Laws" are surely not inherent in the human species, nor in any 
other; the capacity for making rules may be. "Survival behavior," says Des Pres, 
"reveals a fixed system of activity, biological in origin, which is specific to 
humanness as such" (p. 194). No matter how impressive the story of survival 
the author tells, it is difficult to follow him into this trendy and largely unsub- 
stantiated area of speculation. If survival were a fixed system of activity, geno- 
typically established for all time, why did 6 million people allow themselves 
to be annihilated? Were they examples of faulty genotypes? 
To say that living beings struggle to maintain life is one thing; to say that 
they struggle because they are genetically programmed to do so is either mean- 
ingless or frivolous. Meaningless because so many died; frivolous because biology 
is the study of life and assumes that living organisms Will live. If biologists studied 
death instead, they would assume that organisms tend to die. In fact, organisms 
live and die, and many aspects of both processes are doubtless genetically con- 
trolled. Beyond that, however, it is difficult to generalize, and the location of the 
death genes is as difficult to establish as the location of the survival genes. 
Thus the most telling point made by Des Pres is muted: people in concen- 
tration camps-some people, not all-were able to relearn, to reorganize their be- 
havior, and to survive. Social organization is a precondition for human life, but it 
is not clear that some instinct for social life was operative in the camps: these 
were not human beings stripped to the level of raw "instinct"; they were fully 
socialized human beings who, as a condition of survival, replaced one social 
organization with a more viable one. Those who abandoned hope were killed 
by their captors; those who abandoned morality were killed by their comrades. 
These who survived were those who were able to adapt, not those programmed 
80 Book Reviews 
for survival in some mysterious way. The capacity to adapt, that most marvelous 
of human abilities, deserves more credit than it is given. 
One Soviet inmate, quoted on page 94, put it best: 
Human beings are like weeds. They take some killing. Now if you treated horses 
like this they'd be dead in a couple of days. 
Eugenia Shanklin 
Department o f  Sociology and Anthropology 
Trenton State College 
Trenton, New Jersey 
Andrew P. Vayda 
Department o f  Human Ecology and Social Sciences 
Cook College, Rutgers University 
New Brunswick, New Jersey 
Biogenetic Structuralism. By Charles D. Laughlin, Jr., and Eugene G. d'Aquili. 
Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1974, 211 pp., illustra- 
tions, notes, references, index, $10.00 (cloth). 
Because the brain is the place where human biology and culture interact, 
the structures and functions of this organ are of major importance to the study 
of human ecology and social behavior. I had great hopes that Biogenetic Struc- 
turalism would show how this interaction takes place in those structures and 
functions. I was disappointed to find an obsessive preoccupation with only a 
small part of the story: genetically determined cerebral subsystems. 
The major thesis of Biogenetic Structuralism is that perhaps "most social 
(and linguistic) universals are manifestations of genetically determined neurognos- 
tic models, or sets of such models, in the deep memory structure of the human 
brain" (p. 155). These neurognostic models are envisioned to be spatiotemporal 
patterns of organization in the neuronal activity of the brain's association areas. 
They are thought to store representations of reality in something like holographic 
interference patterns of postsynaptic potentials, and these models are believed to 
govern the behavior of human beings. The authors contend that "The most 
fundamental m o d e l s . . ,  are structured genetically and thus provide a biogenetic 
base for the organization of sensory input" (p. 82). These genetic structures are 
held to be similar in all people, and this, we are told, may explain "the deep 
structural similarities in various human societies noted by Levi-Strauss, Piaget, 
Chomsky, Slobin, and others, as well as for the universal similarities in un- 
conscious production so well documented by Jung" (p. 103). 
The book does have several features to recommend it. First and most 
striking, it is interdisciplinary. The authors (whose backgrounds include an- 
thropology, linguistics, neurological science, and psychiatry) discuss an impres- 
sive diversity of topics ranging from Plato to Pavlov and from "culturology" to 
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the Krebs cycle. Second, it does try to bring an evolutionary perspective to bear 
on our understanding of the human brain. As the authors put it, the book at- 
tempts "to found [orthodox] structuralism on a meaningful physical base and 
to answer questions concerning the evolution of cognitive structures through the 
course of hominid development" (p. 14). And, third, it is daring. Laughlin and 
d'Aquili propose volatile new explanations for, among others, (1) the size of 
the human brain (an "allometric by-product" of selection for increased body 
size), (2) the evolution of tool use and language (effects, not causes, of  the in- 
creased organizational complexity of the brain), (3) science and empiricism ("the 
underlying mode of human inquiry is structured biogenetically" p. 143), and (4) 
sleep (a period of release from sensory input to allow for modification of dendritic- 
synaptic structures). 
However commendable, these assets still do not outweigh a number of 
serious, general flaws in Biogenetic Structuralism which threaten to distort our 
understanding of biology, culture, and human behavior. First, Laughlin and 
d'Aquili misrepresent the evolutionary process that is central to their "evolu- 
tionary neurostructural approach." Uncritically and without evidence, they 
assume that natural selection in primates operates exclusively at the level of social 
groups and demes. Human traits are thus examined for their evolutionary sig- 
nificance "for the species" or "reproductive population" as a whole. Apparently 
unaware of the arguments and evidence that interindividual selection is usually 
more important in evohition, they then propose some improbable group selection 
pathways for the evolution of their cerebral structures. Ironically, these arguments 
suggest just how unlikely their postulated structures may be. 
To give one example we are told that a neurognostic structure for clinical 
depression would have evolved as aa built-in mechanism for dominant males to 
move down the group hierarchy once they become too old to be effective." 
When a few failure experiences cause this structure to be activated, the alpha 
male 
may experience helplessness or "depression" resulting in withdrawal and his 
relatively peaceful replacement by other males in the dominant position . . . . .  Ac- 
tivation of this neurognostic structure may provide the smooth transition the 
group needs to survive. (pp. 121-122) 
At times, an activated "depression structure" would sacrifice the reproduc- 
tive interests of a dominant male for the good of some or all of his associates. 
This presents a problem. The organic evolution of such a structure would require 
a sustained amount of group selection sufficient to override opposing individual 
selection. Until we have convincing documentation for such an occurrence in 
primate evolution, theory alone would sooner suggest that such a structure did 
not evolve. No wonder these authors remain unable to specify a definite neural 
structure behind this behavior. Chances are good that there isn't one. 
A similar misuse of evolutionary theory arises in their discussion of a 
polygenic model for schizophrenia. The polygenic model is attractive to bio- 
genetic structuralism because of "the important theoretical advantage of em- 
phasizing the interrelationship of multiple cerebral structures and of indicating 
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the redundancy of the mechanisms underlying higher brain function" (p. 177). 
Such an arrangement could well have evolved for its adaptive benefits, but how 
then does one explain the recurrence of its maladaptive form? Easy, say Laughlin 
and d'Aquili: "In terms of polygenic theory, schizophrenia could be thought of 
as simply part of the genetic load, the price paid for  conserving genetic diversity" 
(p. 176, their italics). 
These and other blunders in representing the evolutionary process are still 
not as serious as the obsessive overemphasis on genes that permeates the text. 
The authors rationalize their "heavy emphasis on the inherited quality of neu- 
rognostic structures. . ,  because this concept has great explanatory power in 
analyzing cultural universals" (p. 124). In this, Laughlin and d'Aquili join socio- 
biologists in forgetting that widespread human practices may represent parallel 
cultural solutions to a few basic problems that confront human beings every- 
where. 
In general, their "evidence" for genetic bases is just not convincing: "The 
universal and adaptive quality of the neurognostic structures described in Chapter 
5 (self-other dichotomy, causal thoughts, binary opposition, etc.) seem to 
mitigate against an experiential explanation for the formation of these neu- 
rognostic structures" (p. 182). This argument, used in some form for nearly 
every structure in the book, must be criticized for two reasons. First, there is 
absolutely no reason to believe that the universality of a trait proves its genetic 
origin. There may always be a cultural explanation. Consider their example of 
"binary opposition," "the primitive, but universal, tendency to order reality 
into pairs that are usually subjectively experienced as opposites" (p. 115). The 
observation that people almost everywhere think in terms of light and dark, over 
and under, up and down, etc., in no way proves that this is some wired-in feature 
of our human hardware. For all we know, it may simply reflect the advantage 
of learning to think in these terms in all habitats which have day and night and 
three-dimensional space. 
Second, Laughlin and d'Aquili seem to believe that an adaptive function 
also implies that a trait is genetic. Earlier in the book, they conveniently set this 
up by claiming that cultural behaviors are generally "adaptively superfluous": 
Much that we view as social behavior, institutions, cultural values, etc., among 
contemporary human societies stem from model~ having for the most part no 
adaptive importance to the species or individual reproductive population, p. 97, 
their italics) 
While this assertion nicely supports other claims of Biogenetic Structuralism, it 
strikes me as a bit hasty. The authors want us to believe both that properties of 
the human brain evolved all along for their adaptive value and that the major 
accomplishment of that brain (culture) simultaneously evolved to be adaptively 
superfluous. This is the kind of sloppy thinking that underlies most of the 
genetic theories for human social behavior. In this case, though, the authors' 
inability to see the adaptive value of cultural behaviors may also be a product 
of their looking at the wrong level. 
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In short, the "evidence" presented by Laughlin and d'Aquili to argue that 
cerebral models of reality are inherited in no case refutes the implicit null hy- 
pothesis that they are not. If these authors want biogenetic structuralism to 
guide the social sciences toward "becoming normal sciences with a highly co- 
herent body of nomothetic and predictive theory" (p. 204), they will have to 
do better than this. 
Laughlin and d'Aquili might have laid the groundwork for a really sig- 
nificant breakthrough in our understanding of human behavior had they focused 
more on the interaction of biology and culture and less on postulated imperatives 
of biology. To me it is significant that their "perhaps most compelling body of 
evidence" comes from research on learning (p. 107). There, "What has emerged 
is the recognition that certain behaviors are very easily learned by some species, 
often even after only one trial, while they require the usual or 'normal' number 
of trials to be learned by other species" (p. 110). Such evidence leads to the 
conclusion that these organisms may have built-in mechanisms that facilitate 
learning certain behaviors, particularly those of direct adaptive significance to 
the organism. Laughlin and d'Aquili actually review the evidence that human 
phobias represent such "prepared learning," but they fail to read the important 
message of this example. To me, it is significant that their best evidence involves 
the interaction of inheritance and learning and leads to behavior of  adaptive value 
to individual human beings. 
William H. Durham 
Division of  Biological Sciences and Society of  Fellows 
University of  Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Chemicals in Food and Environment. M. Webb, Scientific Editor. British Medical 
Bulletin, Volume 31, Number 3. Medical Department, The British Council, 
London, 1975, 87 pp., $9.00 (paper). 
The British Medical Bulletin serves an important function in medical liter.a- 
ture. It has a long tradition of publishing up-to-date collections of related papers 
on a wide variety of relatively specific topics, which are of great concern to 
clinicians and researchers. The issue under review continues this tradition. There 
is no question that chemicals in food and environment is a timely topic and one 
that is of interest to a diverse group of scientists and laymen. It is certainly of 
major importance to many human ecologists. 
In the brief space of 87 pages, 15 papers are presented. All are summary 
reviews of the state of the art. A minimum of new data is provided, but the 
references include a large proportion of recently published material. The authors 
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are British, and the majority of the data presented are based on studies carried 
out in the United Kingdom. This may reduce the collection's appeal to an Ameri. 
can audience. 
Although they usually focus on specific topics, it is possible to divide these 
studies into three major groups: general themes, papers dealing with chemicals 
naturally occurring in foods, and those concerr~ed with chemicals introduced 
into foods and the environment through human activities. The authors assume 
primarily either an epidemiological or toxicological perspective. 
Three papers fall into the "general group." Neuberger's "Introduction" 
places the subject in a historical framework and examines the role of the scientist 
in pollution studies. He notes: "The function of the scientist is to provide 
the facts, and to remain as objective as he possibly can be in presenting his 
data and in interpreting them" (p. 183). This caveat is often more easily sug- 
gested than followed. Pochin's paper on "The Acceptance of Risk" examines 
mortality rates and other data on occupational and nonoccupational risks. The 
author raises a number of important points regarding the evaluation and accep- 
tance of risk and suggests the need for providing populations with quantitative 
estimates of risk levels associated with toxic chemicals. The final paper in this 
group, "Importance of Epidemiological Studies Relating to Hazards of Food and 
Environment," by Higgins, clearly examines the role of epidemiological studies 
in the evaluation of chemical hazards. A number of examples are considered 
and the importance of monitoring and surveillance is stressed. This paper is 
among the most significant for human ecologists. 
Three papers deal with naturally occurring food toxins. I found the first 
two papers in the group particularly informative because they integrate toxi- 
cological and epidemiological data. Crampton and Charlesworth's paper, "Oc- 
currence of Natural Toxins in Food," considers data which show that toxic 
chemicals may be normal ingredients of foods. The focus is primarily on oxalate 
toxicity and on substances shown to be carcinogenic in animals, but the authors 
also include a useful table of other food toxins known to affect man. In "My- 
cotoxins," Austwick presents a comprehensive review of toxins produced by 
fungi and some mycotoxicoses of humans and animals. Spicer's very brief 
article on "Toxicological Assessment of New Foods" discusses the appraisal of 
diet safety and concentrates on possible toxicity associated with two "new" 
foods, soya beans and microbial protein. 
The remaining nine papers consider various aspects of the introduction of 
chemicals into foods and the environment through human activities. Three of 
these deal specifically with foods. In "Analytical Surveys of Food," Egan and 
Hubbard discuss specific examples of contaminants and illustrate the needs for, 
and strategies behind, surveys which identify traces of toxic substances. The 
problem of repeated ingestion of small amounts of toxic substances is addressed 
by Barnes in "Assessing Hazards from Prolonged and Repeated Exposure to Low 
Doses of Toxic Substances." He stresses our limited knowledge of important 
variables such as tissue concentration and speed of reaction, the nature of the 
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toxic injury, and sensitization. This is certainly an area that demands further 
investigation. Lloyd and Drake, in "Problems Posed by Essential Food Preser- 
vatives," examine chemicals used to extend the usable period of foods. They 
suggest that "In the final analysis it will be necessary to measure the benefit 
that accrues from the availability of preservatives and compare it with the scale 
of 'hazards' resulting from dietary sources as a whole, and not least, the natural 
constituents of food" (p. 218). Many of the ideas considered in this section relate 
to points made in Pochin's paper on the acceptance of risk. What is, and is not, 
acceptable? 
Goulding considers "Chemical Hazards in the Home." He reviews statistical 
data from England and Wales on common household poisons and poisoning, and 
concludes that the danger of such chemicals has probably been overstressed. 
Three papers deal with heavy metals in the environment. In "Lead: The 
Relation of Environment and Experimental Work," Clayton examines the occur- 
rence of lead in soil, water, and air, and the toxicological effects of mild exposure 
to lead on enzymes, mental development, and the fetus. Although the effects of 
large doses of lead on the human organism are well known, the long-term effects 
of mild continuous exposure remain to be elucidated. Chemical and toxicological 
properties of "Mercury and Mercurials" are addressed by Magos. Even though a 
causal relationship between methylmercury poisoning and Minamata.disease has 
been clearly established, Magos suggests that the dangers of mercurial contamina- 
tion of the environment have been exaggerated. The final paper on metals, 
"Cadmium," by Webb, reviews the biochemical and toxicological aspects of 
environmental cadmium. Unknown hazards of prolonged low-level exposure in 
humans are emphasized. 
Problems of "Water Supplies of the Future and the Recycling of Drinking- 
Water" are examined by Martin. Maintenance of adequate potable supplies 
demands that attention be directed to factors such as concentration of mineral 
salts, pollution by organic substances, and microbiological hazards. The air we 
breathe is no less important than the water we drink. In "Carbon Monoxide," 
Lawther reviews the sources, distribution, absorption, and toxic effects of carbon 
monoxide, and considers air quality criteria. The volume concludes with book 
reviews of several related publications. 
These papers provide informative summaries of varied topics related to 
chemicals in food and the environment. The long-term effect of  small doses of 
toxic substances is a recurrent major theme. I recommend this collection to 
those who are concerned with these aspects of human ecology. 
Lowell E. Sever 
Department of Anthropology and Division of EpMemiology 
School of Public Health 
University of California 
Los Angeles, California 
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Fields of the Tzotzil: The Ecological Bases of Tradition in Highland Chiapas. By 
George A. Collier. University of Texas Press, Austin, 1975, xv + 255 pp., 
figures, photographs, graphs, maps, bibliography, index, $9.75 (cloth). 
The Indians of the Central Highlands of Chiapas in Mexico have been 
studied extensively. During the t960s, hundreds of research reports were pro- 
duced by small armies of investigators from Harvard, Stanford, Chicago, and 
elsewhere. This book is one of the most conceptually ambitious and complex 
products. Collier is a Stanford social anthropologist who draws both on his 
Harvard fieldwork and on other research "to characterize the causes of tradi- 
tional [Indian] behavior and the reasons for its persistence" (p. 3). 
He focuses on "the bases of Tzotzil tradition through an ecological analysis 
of the factors bearing on Tzotzil land use" (p. xiv). These include kinship and 
land tenure, land abuse, land-use patterns, input-output analysis of farming 
practices, social/ethnic status and its historical development, mobility, demogra- 
phy, occupational specialty, the region's "refuge" status in the nation, nativistic 
movements, and Indian nationalism. This expansive and integrated treatment of 
land use should please interdisciplinarians. Collier's extensive command of these 
empirical matters reflects apparently profuse and careful fieldwork. While de- 
serving of attention, some of his theoretical and methodological views are less 
convincing. 
The main thesis is that tradition is a "dynamic, adaptive response" of 
Tzotzil Indians to "their special placement in a larger, encompassing system" 
(p. xiv). Such a system is characterized as "the very evident hierarchy of social 
relations leading upward from family to hamlet, township, intertribal, and 
interethnic relations embedded in a context of state and national processes" 
(p. xiv). Collier chooses not only to look at Indians in their relatively isolated 
home territories but also to see them as parts within larger wholes. Thus the 
Indians' "environment" is conceived to include both the local physiographic 
features "usually thought of" and also "less tangible," although "equally im- 
portant," impacts of, for example, "distant markets or national political ide- 
ology" (p. 3). This attention to a spatial hierarchy of "environmental" data is 
one part of Collier's "ecology." The other derives from "semiautonomous" 
traditional Indian subsystems of kinship, social organization, and ethnic-group 
relations, which have "regular, recurrent, or relative stable features of internal 
organization" (p. 3). His "ecology," then, views these subsystem features as 
being "conditioned by" a large set of environmental factors. Unfortunately, 
Collier does not clarify whether "tradition" itself also becomes a "conditioning 
factor" helping to modify man-land relationships within the larger system. 
Four situations evince environmental factors that "condition" Tzotzil 
livelihood: (1) their increasingly heavy use of rented lowland farms to sup- 
plement traditional highland subsistence agriculture, (2) dependence on distant 
wage-labor markets by Indians whose highland territory is destructively over- 
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populated, (3) ethnic discrimination against Indians derived from their sub- 
ordinate social position within an already geographically and economically 
marginal "refuge region," and (4) a "nativistic colonization effort that is spurred 
by nationalist agrarian ideology" (p. 5). 
The book's most serious stylistic flaw is the recourse to elusive straw men 
for support of the author's methodological and theoretical pleadings. For 
example, about 80% of one township's income derives from farming rented 
lowlands. This in turn sustains less economically important farming on traditional 
highland plots on which native kinship-property relationships depend. This lends 
to the local (highland) man-land system "an appearance of autonomy actually 
dependent on an external influence" (p. 6). The straw man is the unidentified 
person to whom this system gives an appearance of autonomy. I s it perhaps a 
misguided fellow anthropologist? Elsewhere the straw men are "outsiders [who] 
see pottery production as . . .  [a] principal activity, despite the fact that pot- 
making is a full-time occupation only for poorer women" (p. 173). Perhaps the 
straw men here are mere tourists? Sometimes they carry a more specific label, 
such as the "environmentalist" or "social economist" who is apt to focus too 
sharply on the separation of the highland Mayas from the rest of Mexico; he 
might "analyze the adaptations that these groups make to their locality rather 
than those they make to their environment" (p. 4). 
This flaw is compounded by a paucity of references to pertinent and often 
contrasting literature. "Citations in the Bibliography refer to many sources not 
cited directly in the argument of the book. These citations have been classified 
into categories related to the unfolding of the argument, which can be considered 
a guide to the more detailed background of the study" (p. 225). It is a bad 
scholarly practice, especially in a book that purports to challenge earlier methods 
and interpretations, not to tell reader precisely whose methods and interpreta- 
tions are being challenged. There is veiled criticism of earlier "ethnographers" 
who used the township as the "primary unit of study" (p. 7). Collier gratuitously 
tells us that selection of the "right" unit depends on the problem studied. For 
example, "all Indians have a similar subordinate relation to Ladinos [the cul- 
turally non-Indian population]. This relation is region wide and is best studied 
in relation to the region as a w h o l e . . . "  (p. 8). But one might ask a different 
question: are Indians in all townships equally subordinate to Ladinos? While 
the general subordinate relation is explained, equally interesting variations are 
neglected. To substantiate the implicit criticism of earlier township studies, 
Collier would need to show that this unit was inappropriate for problems under 
investigation. 
Collier's hypothesis is that Tzotzil tradition is not simply a syncretized, 
distinctive indigenous and Spanish cultural complex that has survived. Rather, 
it is a dynamic, active response that Indians make to their marginal niche in a 
larger, changing system. Apparently, he would have us reject the alleged an- 
thropological conventional wisdom that native lifeways persist because they 
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have been isolated from those of the modern world. He shows that (1) substantial 
information and forces of change do reach the Tzotzil from afar, (2) migration 
intermixes the Tzotzil peoples of different traditions, and (3) local economic 
adaptations shift, thus suggesting they lack the bases of tradition. The book's 
contribution rests on calling into question isolation as the single explanation 
for the persistence of tradition, and for offering an interesting alternative ("eco- 
logical") interpretation. However, the importance of communication or isolation 
for particular change or stability is an empirical question. Even though there has 
been some communication from afar and some migration, intermixing does not 
obviate the fact that the Chiapas Highlands have been and still are relatively 
isolated from the mainstream of modern Mexico. One can accept the author's 
focused interest on persistence of tradition, and one can appreciate his carefully 
marshalled evidence to support his view. One need not, however, accept the 
implication that relative isolation does not enter into the explanation. 
If I interpret him correctly, it is Collier's position that tradition is preserved 
if ethnicity (distinctiveness) persists. This is unassailable if one accepts social 
distinctiveness as one's definition of tradition. He also asserts that while distinc- 
tiveness may persist, it is constituted differently over time. Indian lifeways are 
changing. More orthodox students of culture have been willing to interpret such 
changes in land-use practices, economic roles, and spatial mobility as evidences 
of loss of tradition. If, as Collier argues, tradition is distinctiveness (ethnicity), 
then tradition persists; conversely, if tradition is the actual traits representing 
the way of life of the people, then tradition is slowly being lost. Collier chooses 
to view tradition as an ethnic phenomenon that is fundamentally social, rather 
than cultural, and that has an "ecological" basis. In this sense, the Tzotzil are 
like ethnic groups everywhere; their ethnicity is an active, adaptive response to 
placement in a system. One hopes that Collier will soon explain how loss of 
ethnicity occurs. 
A. David Hill 
Department of  Geography 
University of  Colorado 
Boulder, Colorado 
Ecology and Change: Rural Moderni'zation in an African Community. By C. 
Gregory Knight. Academic Press, New York, 1974, xx + 300 pp., maps, 
photographs, figures, appendixes, bibliography, index, $16.50 (cloth). 
Scholars who work within a particular research paradigm are rarely objec- 
tive about the merits of alternative modes of interpretation. To invite a self- 
described analytical economic anthropologist to review a book by a self-admitted 
ecological geographer seems to invite controversy. While I have misgivings about 
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Knight's point of view, I do not intend to question the book's disciplinary value. 
Its treatment of the production system of the Nyiha of Southwest Tanzania may, 
or may not, meet standards of his discipline. I know that it raises problems for 
me. 
Knight's approach is essentially descriptive and inductive. In his own 
words, he treats environment as an absolute and studies how the process of 
"modernization" has occurred within this confine. Population pressure is seen 
as forcing swidden agriculturalists to apply more intensive cultivation methods 
and to develop an expanding cash coffee crop. This process is analyzed in the 
context of agricultural change models developed by Boserup, Allen, Ojo, and 
others. Generalizations about rural transformation are related basically to the 
development of coffee cultivation. If a main conclusion exists, it is that the 
Nyiha have reacted to opportunities for change as rational men who desire to 
minimize uncertainty as they attempt to innovate. 
My estimate is that Knight has no real sensitivity to economic analytical 
methods even though he invokes economics and economists in several instances. 
He treats Boserup's model of variable labor costs as if it were a historical model 
of the evolution of farming systems, and he does not allow for the possibility 
of an indigenous exchange economy. Thus he ignores the growing literature on 
the economic role of cattle in East African indigenous societies and never asks 
how investment in cattle might affect indigenous agricultural inputs. There is a 
general pattern in East Africa of rising opportunity costs associated with agricul- 
ture in relation to increased cattle wealth. Therefore, some allowance must be 
made for the possibility that wealthy cattle owners may move back t o  agricul- 
ture when opportunity costs drop as labor becomes cheap relative to land 
(Boserup's model). The implications of this for internal exchanges and produc- 
tion are problematic. 
His treatment of the habitat as "absolute" creates another problem. This 
in effect focuses attention only on the cos t  of utilizing a certain habitat. Yet the 
negative features of the habitat encourage cattle raising, which is the chief form 
of indigenous wealth. To think of people as being determined by their habitat 
is analytically questionable. 
Finally, Knight indicates in his last chapter that he thinks a reasonable 
guideline to ecologically viable change is one that avoids long-term threat to 
the health of the environment. This is, he says, the ecological perspective. 
Georgescu-Roegen is responsible for having underscored that fact that develop- 
ment is an entropic process. If we are to deny other people the possibility of 
destroying part of the environment in their quest for affluence, we deny devel- 
opment for them. 
Probably the biggest value of the book is its complex description of the 
Nyiha production system. Such descriptions are rare. This aspect of culture has 
been largely ignored by agricultural economists and poorly illuminated by an- 
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thropologists. On balance, then, the book comes across as good description and 
uninteresting analysis. 
Harold K. Schneider 
Department of Anthropology 
Indiana University 
Bloomington, Indiana 
Baegu: Social and Ecological Organization in Malaita, Solomon Islands. By 
Harold M. Ross. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1973, 334 pp., 
photographs, tables, diagrams, appendixes, bibliography, index, $8.95 
(paper).. 
Ethnography has been defined as the description of one culture in the 
terms of another. In the same way, cultural ecology can be seen as the study of 
how one culture's cognized model of its environment relates to the operational 
model of that environment which exists "in reality," and which exists also (one 
hopes) in the mind of the ecologically trained' ethnographer. Harold Ross, how- 
ever, in his book Baegu attempts more than a description of the cultural ecology 
of a forest-dwelling people in the interior mountains of North Malaita, Solomon 
Islands. By organizing his research around the twin themes of social organization 
and ecological adaptation, and by recognizing that residential behavior and land 
tenure are common factors in both, Ross provides himself with both a field- 
work focus and a conceptual theme. The result greatly transcends traditional 
ethnography. The book's value as a description of a pagan culture and subsis- 
tence way of life that has disappeared, unrecorded, from nine-tenths of island 
Melanesia is itself noteworthy, and it was a value that Ross's informants them- 
selves fully appreciated. What Baegu also does is to ask and to provide tentative 
answers to wider questions of residential behavior in agrarian societies. In doing 
so, it also raises some general problems of carrying out fieldwork in human 
ecology. 
It is understandable that as an anthropologist Ross was interested mainly 
in the cognized model of the Baegu environment and in Baegu perceptions of 
residential behavior and kinship relations. In convincing detail, he describes the 
people's world view at microscale (layout of houses and hamlets), mesoscale 
(neighborhoods and districts, and their resources and important features such as 
sacred groves of primary rainforest), and macroscale (Malaita Island, and the 
heavens, hades, and netherworld that surround it). But an understanding of 
this cognized world, as opposed to a mere description of it, requires other sorts 
of data: 
What really existed were people, houses, and garden plots; but the patterns I 
found resulted from human decisions made according to certain criteria. There- 
fore I have tried to develop descriptions of aspects of Baegu behavior, based on 
the way people make decisions. (p. 243) 
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In decisions concerning the siting of a settlement, factors such as water sup- 
ply and access to gardens are paramour. On the other hand, decisions about 
settlement size, which depend on how many households have joined or left 
a hamlet, and consequently decisions about the overall spacing of the population 
relative to its resources, are influenced mainly by social and supernatural factors. 
For example, prolonged residence in one place involves a cumulative increase in 
taboo violations, so that supernatural punishment becomes more and more 
probable. Bad luck is manifested in events like the death of children and crop 
failure. Of course, the disease hazard and the likelihood of soil exhaustion are 
themselves related (in the "operational" view) to the size and persistence of 
settlements and to the frequency of use of garden land, respectively. The strength 
of Ross's approach is in showing how decisions about where to live are processes 
acting through cultural media, being perceived and explained according to beliefs 
that are far removed from the normal subject matter of human ecology. At the 
same time, Baegu residential behavior does function as a human spacing mecha- 
nism providing economic flexibility and permitting a satisfactory development 
of behavioral, social, and cultural patterns. 
The practical problem of Ross's approach to Baegu residential behavior is 
also a general problem of procedure for researchers in human ecology. How can 
one investigator manage to cover both the cognized and the operational spheres 
of ecological processes so that his generaJizations will satisfy specialists in both 
areas? According to Ross, "in a very real sense the ancestor spirits and their living 
descendants are united in a partnership to maintain the fertility of the land" 
(p. 230). In other words, a settlement pattern of small scattered hamlets provides 
the means both to pacify the spirits of the ancestors and, it is presumed, to 
ensure a short period of use of each plot, thus maintaining soil fertility and 
facilitating the succession back to secondary forest. Unfortunately, the cognized 
part of this explanation is far better supported with evidence than are the opera- 
tional, or real-world, processes. The aspect of the "partnership" that we need 
more information on is that between inherent soil quality (which is described 
only in ethnoscientific categories) and the frequency and intensity of cropping, 
itself affected by the spatial location of cultivators relative to land resources. 
Ross's subjective impression was that, as a result of residential behavior, popula- 
tion pressure does not exist in the pagan areas of North Malaita, but he fails to 
explain the apparent success and persistence of a quite different, aggregated 
settlement pattern by Christians in this area. Similarly, he feels that the walking 
distance from house to garden seldom becomes "unreasonable" for the Baegu, 
and so this is not considered a significant factor in residential relocation. Because 
of the author's disciplinary background and the constraints of fieldwork time, it 
is not surprising that hard data on these and other important operational pro- 
cesses are completely lacking. 
In any field project which has the broad intellectual aims that an ecological 
perspective demands, gaps in data or emphasis are bound to occur unless a whole 
team of specialists can be properly integrated and directed-in itself an extremely 
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difficult operation. Only the epidemiological aspects of Baegu ecology have 
benefited from such support, as a result of Ross's collaboration with a Harvard 
Biomedical Expedition. It is a measure of the author's breadth of interest and 
understanding that even in areas where his judgments are necessarily intuitive, 
the argument that he presents is in general highly convincing. His book is well 
organized, is written with clarity and a sense of humor, and is richly illustrated 
with diagrams, maps, and photographs. It deserves a readership far wider than 
one composed entirely of area specialists. 
Tim Bayliss-Smith 
Department of Geography 
University of Cambridge 
Cambridge, England 
The Economics of Natural Environments: Studies in the Valuation of Commodity 
and Amenity Resources. By John V. Krutilla and Anthony C. Fisher. Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975, xviii + 292 pp., maps, tables, 
graphs, notes, index, $16.95 (cloth), $4.50 (paper). 
In this volume, Krutilla and Fisher have brought together a good deal of 
their recent work, some of which has already been published in the professional 
economics literature. Abbreviated versions of studies on prairie wetlands and 
the Alaskan pipeline, which were published by others in Resources for the 
Future's Natural Environments Program, are also included. The first third of 
the text focuses on institutional and theoretical topics. The remainder is case 
studies. Readers of KrutiUa will recognize his hand in both parts, especially 
the conceptual framework in Chapter 2 and the Hells Canyon and White Cloud 
Peaks cases (Chapters 5-7). Fisher's contributions include especially control 
theory, econometrics, and related matters. References are given at the end of 
each chapter. 
This book is written at a level suitable for trained economists. The authors 
characterize their work as a "first-generation" effort to bring the analysis of 
amenity use of natural resources into the body of economic theory and applica- 
tion. Their focus is on the economics of preservation vs. development of natural 
areas. Their contributions include especially the development of a rigorous 
analysis over time, based on a number of concepts not recognized in conven- 
tional benefit-cost analysis. The authors do much to counter the popular Ameri- 
can view that, since land in its natural state has no value, development is called 
for in the interest of improved economic efficiency. Indeed, they show that the 
opposite is frequently the case, where the phrase "improved economic efficiency" 
is interpreted in the economist's sense to mean increased satisfaction of human 
wants from existing resource s , human and natural. 
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The analysis is concerned especially with three influences on the economics 
of preservation and development: (1) technological change, (2) increasing 
demand for amenity use of natural environments, and (3) irreversibility of 
development. Technological change increases the possibilities of  substitution 
among inputs and among products throughout the economy. Since technological 
advance affects only the commercial (not amenity) uses, this makes the extrac- 
tion of a particular mineral at a particular natural area relatively less important 
than preservation of that site. At the same time, the demand for amenities from 
natural areas can be expected to grow with increased population, increased GNP, 
increased leisure, and greater awareness of the value of  a natural experience. The 
combined effect of substitution possibilities and growing amenities demand 
makes preservation increasingly more valuable than development. To the extent 
that development is irreversible, the case against it is strengthened, particularly in 
the presence of uncertainty. Other theoretical considerations are also addressed. 
These include unsettled issues in the selection of a social rate of time discount and 
still more unsettled questions of how to frame intergenerational comparisons. 
Over and above the conceptual biases toward development are the institu- 
tional biases. Most of the latter arise from understatement of conventional 
market costs of development. The authors make no attempt to catalog all of  
these, but note at various points that provisions of the U.S. Internal Revenue 
acts permit the expensing of capital expenditures by the minerals industry, that 
public investments in water resource projects are subsidized by artificially low 
interest rates, and that the U.S. Forest Service conducts "deficit" timber sales, 
where the proceeds do not cover the costs. In the Hells Canyon study, the 
availability of a federally provided electric power transmission system drove 
a wedge between private and social costs of  development. In the prairie wetlands 
study, the absence of a mechanism for compensating private wetland owners for 
wild ducks led to an underproduction of the latter. In the Alaskan pipeline case, 
profit-maximizing calculations by private interests were shifted toward the 
socially more costly and environmentally more damaging trans-Alaskan route, 
and away from the trans-Canadian alternative (which was better on both grounds) 
by import quota-related distortions in petroleum markets. 
Perhaps the subtlest and most important institutional biases are embodied 
in the priority of rights to use natural areas. Thus the Mining Act of 1872 makes 
possible transfer of ownership in fee simple from the government to private 
parties holding valid mineral claims. This situation is analyzed by means of a 
model in which property rights are assigned alternatively to either miners or 
amenity users (pp. 30-33,266,267). Whichever party does not have title (in this 
case, amenity users) will be the poorer as a result. They will therefore have a 
lower market demand (ability to pay) than they would had they been given the 
property right. 
This logic is applied by Krutilla and Fisher to wealth effects arising out of 
liability for economic externalities as well as to wealth effects from conventional 
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aspects of property rights. Unfortunately, I f'md some difficulties in these applica. 
tions. The two-party negotiations of the model may or may not correspond to 
the reality of decision making. If the Minerals Act is amended, property rights 
will, more likely, be retained by the government rather than reassigned to 
amenity users. This means that there are three parties in the decision-making 
process. The government is rationing uses between the other two. Relative changes 
in wealth status arise from subtle aspects of priority rights, rather than from a 
more absolute concept of property. And whatever the case with the Minerals 
Act, application of the wealth effect to nonmining users will generally occur in 
the context of government rationing decisions rather than by direct negotiations 
among users. 
In discussing damages, the authors refer to "the assignment of liability for 
the damages suffered by one group of users of common property resources from 
preemptive, incompatible uses by another group" (p. 266). Preemptive, incom- 
patible use by one individual is present in all private goods consumption, and 
economic theory gives no grounds for assigning liability, so long as the opportunity 
costs of acquisition are paid. The consumption of an apple or an orange by one in- 
dividual preempts others from consuming the same and no liability is incurred to 
the others. As long as all (social) opportunity costs are included in government as- 
sessments against public land users, wherein is Krutilla and Fisher's case different? 
Moreover, if true externalities are present (i.e., if the act of using on the 
part of one gives rise to damages to another, over and above mere preemption), 
then there is a need to assign liability. But economic theory gives some guidance 
on which liability assignments are likely to produce greater economic efficiency. 
If liability is assigned to the damage-creating party, production functions more 
consistent with competitive markets result (Tybout, 1972). 
The authors have almost nothing to say about congestion in their opening 
theoretical discussion, although it appears explicitly (and unavoidably) in three 
of their case studies: Hells Canyon, White Cloud Peaks, and Mineral King. In 
the Hells Canyon case, a "judgment" concept of capacity is used to produce a 
change in growth rates of amenity demand. In the White Cloud Peaks case, a 
more sophisticated concept of congestion, measured by expected numbers of 
trail encounters and camp encounters, is used. The larger the number of either 
of these kinds of encounters, the lower the value of the "wilderness" experience. 
The authors define optimal capacity as "the point at which the incremental 
cost to others from an additional user just equals incremental benefit" (p. 165). 
It can be shown that this concept of optimality can be achieved by charging 
user fees but not, in general, by other means (Tybout, 1976). However, the 
authors do not propose to charge user fees, and it is not national policy to at- 
tempt to control congestion by the use of  fees. Unless some method of con- 
trolling congestion is employed, calculations of the kind done by Krutilla and 
Fisher will not have practical significance in bringing about optimal use. 
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The Mineral King study illustrates this point, although in a way not in- 
tended by the authors. Two alternative uses, preservation and developed recrea- 
tion (skiing), are considered. The authors find, by a simultaneous system applica- 
tion of the travel-cost method, that attendance at the proposed ski resort would 
be 194,000 visitors on a winter weekend, whereas capacity had been pegged at 
25,000. They then calculate annual benefits from capacity attendance in ac- 
cordance with the postulate that "access to the area [is] rationed in such a way 
that each prospective visitor [has] an equal chance of  admiss ion . . . "  (p. 209). 
The effect of  this approach is to multiply the estimate of  unconstrained benefits 
by the ratio 25,000/194,000. They compare the resulting benefits with the 
project costs and then add the displaced wilderness values, which must, of  course, 
also be included as costs of  development. The comparison favors preservation, 
but this is open to question by virtue of  the apparent arbitrariness in their treat- 
ment of  congestion. I cannot think of any practical method of limiting access 
that would approximate random selection. Nor do the authors explain why they 
attach enough empirical significance to their postulated method of rationing to 
base calculations of  benefits on it. 
A more likely method of rationing would be according to willingness to 
pay or willingness to make sacrifices of some other sort. If  admission to the devel- 
oped ski site were estimated on the basis of  a demand and supply equilibrium 
produced by high-enough admission fees (or ski tow charges, or room rents, or 
any of many other ways that excess demand can be turned to the advantage of 
the seller), the effect ,would be to selectively give access to those with the high- 
est value of service. This in turn would produce benefit estimates higher, con- 
ceivably much higher, than the authors use. Whether benefits so calculated would 
be high enough to reverse their finding for preservation is an open question. 
For any project where congestion is a problem, it is necessary to know 
how access will be rationed before one can estimate benefits. If  rationing takes 
the form of admission fees, that is one thing. I f  it takes the form of waiting in 
line, that is another. If it takes the form of capacity to endure crowds when 
one came for solitude, that is still a third. Benefits will, in general, be different 
in each of the three cases. It can be shown that the second and third forms of 
rationing are inferior to the first (Tybout, 1976). Whether the third is interior 
to the second, or vice versa, is an empirical matter, about which no general 
statement can be made. 
A final observation on Krutilla and Fisher's book is that methodological 
contributions are made in the case studies. The simultaneous system travel-cost 
method in the Mineral King study has already been mentioned. The Hells Canyon 
benefit-cost analysis was framed in such a way as to take account of changes 
over time in the relative proportions of  thermal power and hydropower in the 
Northwest power grid with and without development. The absence of conges. 
tion data in the White Cloud Peaks study was remedied by the adaptation of 
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results from a similar location. The models employed in the prairie wetlands 
and Alaskan pipeline cases are of  interest for their own sakes. 
The authors observe in their preface that "this volume doubtless raises 
more issues than it is capable of  resolving satisfactorily" (p. v). So it is with 
first-generation works. But whatever the ratio of  issues resolved to issues raised, 
this book  is a step forward in our efforts to base the preservation-development 
decision on more comprehensive economic concepts. The more comprehensive 
the concepts, the better  the case for preservation. 
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